Abstract: This paper makes an attempt to assess the state of competition in the Indian life insurance industry for the period 2000-01 to 2014-15 highlighting the nature of competition after the economic reforms in the economy. The study is based on secondary data of the insurance companies for the period 2000-01 to 2014-15. A set of concentration measures such as the k-concentration ratio (CRk), Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), the Hall-Tideman index (HTI), Horvath index (HOV), Entropy index (ENT), Ginevicius index, and GRS index is estimated to assess the state of competition. Accuracy of these indices is also tested along with use of concentration curves and indices. Among all the concentration measures, HHI, HTI and GIN indices depict the low market concentration of life insurance companies, compared to other indices. The index value indicates that though the concentration in the market has declined but still it remains at a relatively higher level.
Introduction
The insurance industry has specific features that make it of particular importance to an economy and that distinguish it from other industries. This industry contributes significantly to economic growth by providing long term capital for investment and growth of the economy. Though, there is extensive research on the causal relationship between bank lending and economic growth, what is often ignored is the relationship between insurance and economic growth. Out of all the financial intermediaries, an insurer plays a vital role in transmission of growth impulses from the financial system to the real economy. The insurance companies collect funds by issuing policies and transfer these funds to entities in the real sector, thus helping to finance real investment. Insurance companies, thus perform two very important functions: 1 financial intermediation 2 risk transfer and compensation payment, enabling the promotion of economic growth by providing efficient risk management.
To promote competition in the Indian insurance industry, the Government of India has opened up the sector to private players in August 2000 with 26% foreign equity capital participation of the company. This has been raised to 49% in 2015. It has been more than a decade since the sector was liberalised and the industry needs to be reviewed by studying the emerging trends and benchmarking its status to pre-liberalisation indicators of market structure. The rest of the paper is organised into seven sections. Section 2 gives an overview of theory and Section 3 briefly reviews major studies on competition in insurance and market structure of the insurance industry around the world. The state of competition in the Indian life insurance industry is presented in Section 4. Section 5 states the objective and methodology of the study. Empirical results are analysed in Sections 6 and 7. Finally, in Section 8, some concluding remarks are offered.
Competition: an overview of theory
The notion of competition has been differently perceived in the discipline of Economics. One school of thought views competition as a process of rivalry and another views competition as the state of affairs that is the end result of competition among sellers and buyers (Blaug, 1997) . Going back to the writings of Adam Smith one finds the term 'competition' as a pattern of business behaviour 'to compete' to characterise the process of bringing 'market prices' in line with the 'natural prices' (i.e., cost-covering prices). Thus, the conceptualisation of competition as a state of affairs in the mainstream economics takes end state as the one in which market prices totalled with the so-called 'natural prices' (Blaug, 1997) . It was, however, never mentioned explicitly in the 18th century write-ups. The necessary pre-requisites to secure these end-results such as number of rivals and market information, which was taken up by authors like Cournot and then by Edgeworth into modern definition of perfect competition in terms of large number of sellers, homogenous product, perfect factor mobility and knowledge. These ideas were further developed by authors Robinson and Chamberlin and linked to concepts of imperfect competition and monopolistic competition. The inadequacies underlying the above conceptualisation of competition in capturing the real world situations led to the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm (Mason, 1939 ). The SCP model was then discussed, both in theory and public policy. The empirical regularities in many American industries prompted Mason to propose the observable structural characteristics of a market to determine the behaviour of firms in the market and market performance. Initially, market structure was taken only in terms of number of firms. Conduct i.e., behaviour of firms was taken to be collusion and profits were taken to reflect market performance. The underlying reasoning was, fewer the firms higher the scope for these to collude, to maximise their profits. The concept of market structure was later widened to include size of firms, entry and cost conditions. The number of firms with their size distribution served as a proxy for market concentration. The incumbent firms would worry less about potential competition if it is more difficult or costly for new firms to enter the market. The SCP approach has been criticised for being unidirectional where market structure is taken as given ignoring the interrelations among market structure, conduct and performance. However, subsequently market structure has been mainly captured through sellers' concentration that is measured by concentration ratios, the most important measure being Herfindahl index i.e., sum of squares of market shares of existing firms.
Review of literature
There are very few empirical studies available on the Indian insurance sector and most of them investigate performance of the insurance companies by analysing the profitability ratios. However, there is substantial literature available on 'measuring competition' applied to a number of other sectors like manufacturing, banking etc. The scarcity of empirical studies in this field is mostly due to a shortage of historical data on insurers. However, in developed insurance markets, like USA, France, Spain, Netherlands etc. there are several studies available, which have examined different aspects of the insurance industry. A brief overview of the past studies on measuring competition in insurance industry around the world is discussed below. Epple and Schäfer (1996) in a study of housing insurance find that risk limitation for the monopoly insurer differs fundamentally and by the nature of the system from that of competitiveness. In monopolised risk community of Baden-Wurttemberg (BW), the prescribed territorial protection with its legal exclusion rights is commensurate with the comprehensive coverage of elementary damage offered for all buildings. It prevents negative risk selection, provides strength due to size, and guarantees a good price. In contrast, competitive insurers 'negotiate' insurance coverage and must, as a result of market-related adverse selection, limit the risk and tailor their product. They have to incorporate specific risks into their basic insurance package by means of risk mark-ups, exclusion of liability, sum limitations, and if necessary high deductibles; they therefore automatically and unavoidably provide narrower insurance coverage. The study emphasises two points:
1 the importance of increase in prices due to additional costs imposed by competition 2 the difficulty of maintaining global coverage against natural damages that was one of the hallmarks of the monopoly situation.
In case of BW, housing insurance monopoly had its roots in the ideals of social welfare and of mutual cooperative solidarity based on the legal requirement for an insurance collective. It never acted on the theory of maximum profits for a monopolist. The consequence of the introduction of competition is the necessity to pass the additional cost on to the customers and premium rates have also increased (including rise in insurance tax). In another study, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1997) raise an important point when they describe the insurance markets from being different from most other markets because in insurance, market competition can destroy the market rather than working for better. One dimension along which insurance companies compete is underwriting, i.e. trying to ensure that the risks covered are 'good' risks or that if a high risk is insured; the premium charged is at least commensurate with the potential cost. The resulting partitioning of risk limits the amount of insurance that potential insurance customers can buy. In the extreme case, such competitive behaviour will destroy the insurance market altogether. The paper concludes that an important problem both for theory and policy is to devise ways for providing health insurance that use the power of competition to bring about efficiencies without severely limiting people's ability to insure against misfortune. Envisioning competition and insurance 20 years from then, the author states that as the ability to predict health outcome improves, this issue will become more salient. To date policy makers have not had enough information about health status to make risk adjustment practical. It may be possible that revolution in genetic science will provide insurers and regulators with enough information to make real risk adjustment possible. Rao (2000) remarks in his paper that conventional theory of competitive markets does not apply directly in the study of insurance business in less developed economies where credit and insurance markets are either thin or non-existent and in many developing economies the market is regulated. To be specific, in the insurance market, asymmetry of information leads to moral hazard and adverse selection. Being incapable of incurring high monitoring costs, the insurer/lender fails to gather sufficient information on the economic agent. Moral hazard arises when the insurer or lender is unable to discern the undertaken activities of the insured/borrower and fails to foresee the probability of an adverse event. If the insured/borrower knows his/her own risk but the insurer/lender does not, then it affects the realised ex post profitability, which falls below the ex-ant profitability of a contract signalling adverse selection. The insurer may charge premiums based on its calculated average experience. But the low risk individual being aware of the riskiness of the enterprise may not opt for insurance. And in this process, low risk prone individuals end up with less insurance paying a low premium. Thus, the insurer is exposed to high risk leading to market failure. The paper highlights that macroeconomic implications of privatisation and foreign participation in the insurance sector are far reaching but the path must be approached cautiously with a 'step-by-step' approach and should be preceded by microeconomic institutional and legal reforms. Rastogi and Sarkar (2007) identify the causes and the objectives with which the Indian insurance sector was reformed in 2000 to conclude that only in the last decade, the hybrid model of privatisation with regulation adopted by the government has yielded positive results. The sector in its present form looks promising for the consumers, the insurers and the nation as a whole. Thus the firms, the industry and the nation are healthier than ever before having adopted this model. Acharya (2012) examines the state of competition in life and non-life insurance sectors in India primarily by using a variety of concentration measures. The results indicate that the market concentration of the life insurers is high in presence of LIC than in its absence. There is a fall in the concentration for the nine years period (2001-02 to 2009-10) of the life insurers in both the samples including and excluding LIC. The study also summarises the discussions and field interviews with middle and senior managers (with an average of 10-12 years of industry experience) on understanding the level of commoditisation and the marketing response by the insurance companies. Most of the executives find the product offering by their companies to be homogeneous and easily inter-changeable with the products offered by the competitor. Both private and public sector insurers point out that the customers gravitate towards lowest price products and covert commission kick-backs are fairly common. Most of the executives see no risk for the customers if they switch insurance providers. The executives feel that there has been no change in the product mix offered by the insurance companies since the start of the financial crisis. In fact, the insurance companies had attempted product innovation through ULIPS, which did not find favour with the regulators. Bikker and Haaf (2002) discuss the theoretical characteristics of ten market concentration measures and numerical examples illustrate differences and similarities between these concentration indices in operation. Measures of competition can be divided into structural and non-structural ones. In structural approaches concentration ratios take a central position in order to describe the market structure, forging a natural link between concentration and competition. The impact of market concentration on market performance has its roots in both the oligopoly theory and the SCP paradigm. Non-structural approaches to measuring competition do not depend on concentration. The survey includes empirical results of the various methods applied to the European banking industry. Ginevičiusa and Čirba (2009) examine effectiveness of the additive measures to assess market concentration most effectively. The analysis shows that all currently used measures, including the most widely used Herfindahl index, have some limitations and, therefore, cannot adequately describe the market state. This index is still widely used because it is easy to calculate. However, now, when calculation is computer-aided, this argument hardly makes sense. A possibility to assess the state of the market much more accurately, searching for new, more precise measures, seems to be more relevant now. The accuracy of some particular measures may be defined by the total difference between the relative value of market criterion bearers in the market and their value calculated by the formula of a particular concentration measure. The smaller the total difference between the relative value of the criterion bearer in the market and relative value calculated by the formula of an additive measure, the more accurate is the additive measure. A new formula suggested in the paper is the GRS index, which yields zero deviation. Therefore, it may be used both in theoretical research and practical calculations. Mishra et al. (2011) attempt to examine the accuracy of the conventional additive measures of market concentration by using the criteria suggested by Ginevičiusa and Čirba (2009) for the Indian manufacturing sector. The study found that the GRS Index of Ginevičiusa and Čirba (2009) is a more accurate measure of market concentration. The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the most widely used measure of market concentration, deviates far from accuracy. Hence, examining market concentration on the basis of the conventional indices may result in misleading conclusions and guide policy in wrong directions. In another study, Mishra and Rao (2014) compare the market structure in different industries using conventional additive measures and various indices of firm size inequality. The study found that levels or changes in market structure are not exactly consistent across various measures. However, as compared to additive measures, inequality indices give more consistent results. Hence they can be used to examine the structure of markets in different industries. As, there are inconsistencies across different inequality indices, efforts should be made by the researcher towards formulating a suitable criterion for selecting the most appropriate measure. Miller (1955) tries to examine the significance of various measures of monopoly power and concentration for both economic analysis and public policy. It is perhaps a sign of the immaturity of the Science of economics that the notion should persist that the competitiveness of the economy or of a sector of the economy can ultimately be characterised by some single number or set of numbers. One might have supposed that theoretical and empirical developments in the last two decades would have brought home the essentially heterogeneous nature of our industrial structure and behaviour. But the illusion still persists in influential quarters that there is some simple key which will enable us to separate the monopolistic from the competitive. Bikker and Leuvensteijn (2008) investigate competition by analysing several factors which may affect the competitive nature of a market and various indirect measurement approaches. After discussing various supply and demand factors, which may constitute a so-called tight oligopoly, they establish the existence of scale economies and the importance of cost X-inefficiency, since severe competition would force firms to exploit available scale economies and to reduce X-inefficiencies. Both scale economies and X-inefficiencies turn out to be substantial, although more or less comparable to those found for insurers in other countries and to other financial institutions. Further, they applied the Boone (2004) indicator, a novel approach to measuring the effects of competition. This indicator points to limited competition in comparison to other sectors in the Netherlands. Further investigations of submarkets should reveal which policy measures might be appropriate in order to promote competition.
Literature and the associated empirical evidences, illustrate both advantages and disadvantages of concentration in the service led industry like, banking and insurance (Beck et al., 2006) . The advantages are: a the impact of systematic crisis is expected to be less in a more concentrated market b it is often argued that it is easier to supervise a few large players than a number of small players in the industry.
However, on the flip side:
a high concentration is often associated with higher price (premium) resulting from a collusion among the insurers b the risks of 'too-big' fail are more acute in the highly concentrated sector c more competitive the industry, the country will suffer less from any crisis or market failure.
State of competition in Indian life insurance industry
Over the years, the structure of the Indian life insurance industry has noticeably changed, in terms of, number of insurers, products, innovative instruments, pricing and regulation.
In the initial years of deregulation, four private insurers entered the hitherto untapped market Source: IRDAI (2015a IRDAI ( , 2015b In the last few years, LIC (refer to Figure 1 ) was continuously gaining market share (based on total premium), but in 2014-15, the trend has been reversed due to rise in premium collections by private insurers (especially in unit linked products). In the private sector, ICICI Prudential holds the number one position in market share, followed by HDFC Standard Life, SBI Life and Bajaj Allianz. The top 10-insurers together hold 95% of the total market share and the remaining 14 insurers account for only a 5% of the business in total premium in the life insurance industry in India.
To have a clear view of the structure and growth pattern of the Indian life insurance industry, the study analysed the market share of the top ten insurers both by including and excluding LIC, for the period 2000-01 to 2014-15. The data is annual and covers the latest available year i.e. 2014-15. To calculate the market share of the life insurers, we consider both 'total premium' and 'first year premium (includes single premium)'.
Market share (including LIC)
The market share of LIC in both 'total premium' and 'first year premium' is seen declining after the entry of new private sector players in 2000, except in the years 2011-12, 2012-13, 2013-14 . In these three years, the private players' business declined due to regulatory changes in ULIPs and economy slowdown, which helped LIC to gain market share in terms of 'total premium' and 'first year premium'. Though, private life insurers market their products aggressively to customers, yet LIC continues to hold a major market share as compared to its competitors mainly due to its huge geographical coverage and vast network of experienced agents.
Market share (excluding LIC)
For a better comparison of market share of private life insurers, in this section the exercise excludes LIC from the group and calculates market share. Here, ICICI Prudential leads the with the maximum market share in terms of total premium and also in the first year single premium. Interestingly, it is observed from Tables 3 and 4 that in the year 2013-14 market share in first year premium has increased for four insurers, out of 12 insurers (as reported) but in 'total premium' it has increased for six and for rest of six it has declined. This is due to failure in renewal policy payment, which is a concern for the industry as a whole. Now, the question is; why have customers not renewed the policy? This may be due to mis-selling by the insurers or due to lack of proper return as compared to other financial instruments like: mutual funds, bank fixed deposits etc.
The present study, data and methodology
This study tries to examine the market structure and level of competition in the Indian life insurance industry, following available concentration measures in literature. To assess the level of competition in the Indian life insurance industry, the study uses insurer wise data on 'total premium' and 'first year premium' for the period 2000-01 to 2014-15. All the data are of annual frequency and are secondary in nature. The data of the insurers are collected from different publications of IRDAI like Quarterly Journal, Annual Reports and Handbook of Indian Insurance. However, some of the financial indicators of the individual life insurers are collected from the balance sheet of the respective insurers. As competition needs to be calculated for the life insurance industry as a whole, all the companies operating in the study period are included.
In economics, "competition is defined as the effort of two or more parties, who perform independently, trying to get what the other party is seeking at the same time like sales, profit, and market share, by offering the best feasible combination of price, quality, and service". Though, this definition clearly defines the meaning, it does not offer an insight on 'how to measure competition'. To measure competition in a market, concentration ratios are widely used mainly due to their ability to capture structural features of the market. In industrial economics, concentration ratio is a measure of the total output produced in an industry by a given number of firms in the industry. This ratio reflects the changes in market concentration as a result of the entry or exit of a company into the market or caused by a merger. In literature, there are mainly two approaches to measure competition in any market economy; a structural approach and b non-structural approach.
The concentration ratios are often used in structural models to explain the competitive behaviour in insurance and banking industries. In general, the concentration indices (CI) exhibiting the following form:
Here, Si is the market share of the firm/company, W i is the weight attached to the market share and n is the number of firms/companies in the industry. The mathematical formulae and the basic properties of each of the measures are discussed below Haaf, 2000, 2002) .
The k-concentration ratio (CR k )
In empirical literature, k-concentration coefficient is used mainly due to its simplicity and limited data requirements. The ratio is defined as the sum of market shares of 'n' largest insurers in the market and it takes the form:
where, Si is the market share of insurer i and k is the number of insurance companies in the industry (i = 1 2…k). In this method, the concentration ratio gives equal emphasis to all the 'k' leading insurers and neglects the effect of many small companies in the market. There is no general rule determining the optimal value of 'k'. However, in empirical analysis, 'k' is generally determined to be 3, 4 or 5. The ratio ranges between 0 and 1. It approaches zero, if there is an infinite number of very small insurance companies in the system and it equals 1, if there is a single insurer in the market. If the industry consists of 'k' equally sized insurance companies, then
which is a decreasing function of the number of insurance companies in the market. To estimate the index, by and large, the market shares of the insurer, in 'total premium' and 'first year premium' are being used. The index provides information only about shifts in market shares between the top n insurers and the remaining small insurance companies, but does not capture changes in distribution within these two groups. Moreover, it ignores the structural changes in the part of the industry which is not included in concentration ratio and also neglects the competitive influence of small companies on the decisions of the large banks in the market (Bikker and Haaf, 2002) .
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI)
The HH index is defined as the sum of the squares of the relative sizes (expressed as proportions of the total size of the market) of the firms/companies in the market. The formula takes the form as:
where Si stands for the market share of the i th company in the industry. HHI stresses the importance of larger firms by assigning them a greater weight age than smaller firms, and it incorporates each firm individually, so that random cut-offs and insensitivity to the share distribution is avoided. This index ranges between 0 to 1 (0 to 10,000, if market shares are expressed in terms of percent rather than in fractions). The values of 0 and 1 represent perfect competition and monopoly respectively. Usually, a value in the range 0 to 0.10 indicates highly competitive market (non-concentration), a value within 0.10 to 0.20 indicates that there is no adverse effect on competition. However, the value above 0.20 is a concern and needs to increase competition further in the industry.
In empirical literature and also in practice, HHI is the most common measure to measure concentration in the industry, largely due to its simplicity. The flip side of HHI lies in its assigning higher weight to the bigger firms and smaller weights to the smaller firms. This not only raises the importance of the larger firms in the index, it also reduces the effects of the smaller firms even if they are very large in number, giving a distorted measure of market concentration.
The Hall-Tideman index (HTI)
The concentration indices developed by Hall and Tideman (1967) bring forward a number of properties that concentration measures should satisfy and emphasise the need to include the number of companies in the calculation of a concentration index. It is estimated by using the following formula:
Here, the market share of each insurer is weighted by its ranking in order to ensure that the emphasis is on the absolute number of insurers, and that the largest insurance companies receives weight of i = 1. The HTI ranges between 0 and 1, being close to 0 for an infinite number of equal-sized companies, and reaching 1 in the case of monopoly. Like the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, the HTI equals 1/n for an industry with n equally sized insurance companies and the numbers equivalent of the index is defined as ne = 1 / HTI.
Horvath index (HOV)
The Horvath index (1970) of market concentration is capable of reflecting both relative dispersion and absolute magnitude. The index is defined as the sum of the proportional share of the leading company and the summation of the squares of the proportional sizes of each company, weighted by a multiplier reflecting the proportional size of the rest of the industry. The index owes its intellectual heritage to the HHI and is defined as:
Here, s i represents market share of the largest firm in the industry. The value of the index ranges between 2 3 3 3 1 n n n − + (for n ≠ 2) and 1, i.e., 2 3 3 3 1 n n n − + ≤ HOR ≤ 1 with n being the number of firms in the industry. This index assigns larger weights to all the market players, compared to HHI. This index is also known as a 'comprehensive concentration index (CCI)' as it accounts for market share of the largest firm in a discrete manner and that of other firms in a weighted form.
Entropy index (ENT)
The Entropy measure has its theoretical foundations in information theory and measures the ex-ante expected information content of a distribution. The Entropy measure is defined as, 1 1 ln
This index generally measures the degree of uncertainty faced by a firm in the marketplace. The value of the Entropy varies inversely to the degree of concentration. In case of monopoly there is no uncertainty in the market and the index takes the value zero. On the other hand, when there is 'n' number of firms and all of them are equal in size, there are uncertainties in the market and the index takes the value ln(n). Hence, the index ranges between 0 and ln(n), and is therefore not restricted to [0, 1] , as most of the other measures of concentration presented above. This index is criticised for using the logarithm of the market share rather than its value as the weight. As a result, the importance of the larger firms decreases, while that of the smaller ones relatively increases.
Ginevicius index
The Ginevicius index is given by the formula
This index is intended to assess two basic market indicators, the number of firms in the industry and their market share in a balanced way. It is based on the assumption that larger the number of suppliers, greater is the competition and higher is the uncertainty in the market. The degree of this uncertainty depends on market shares of the firms when there is monopoly GIN = 1. On the other hand, as n → ∞, GIN → 0. In other words, as the number of firms in the industry increases, the degree of seller's concentration in the market declines. Hence, this index takes the value 0 ≤ GIN ≤ 1. GIN index gives emphasis to both the number of firms in the industry and their market share. However, it fails to represent the true scenario of market concentration, particularly when the distribution of market share is highly skewed towards few firms.
GRS index
The GRS Index suggested by Ginevičiusa and Čirba (2009) is an attempt to overcome the weighting problem and thereby to provide a more accurate measure of market concentration. In this index, the weights to different firms are assigned in such a way that: 
where s 1 stands for market share of the largest firm in the industry. 
• Uses the logarithm of the market share rather than its value as the weight value
• Importance of larger firms decreases while smaller ones relatively increases Table 5 Features of concentration measures (continued)
Index type Defined as Range Features
Ginevicius index 1 1 ( )
• It emphasises both the number of firms and heir market share;
• Fails to represent true scenario of market concentration particularly when the distribution of market share is highly skewed towards few firms GRS index
• Attempt to overcome the weighting problem to provide a more accurate measure of market concentration
• Market share of each insurer is weighted by its ranking in order to ensure that the emphasis is on the absolute number of companies Among the above discussed approaches to measure concentration in an industry, the choice of the concentration index is mainly dependent on the policy makers'/researchers' perception of the relative influence on competition attached to large and small firms or companies. The HHI and the k-concentration ratio appear most frequently, both in theory and practice. The simple structure of these two indices and the limited data requirement of the CR k contribute to this success. Applied to various markets, these indices appear to bring forth virtually similar rankings, which add to their suitability in practise. The theoretical justification of CR k and the HHI as measures of concentration was derived in connection with the relationship between market structure and market performance.
Results and discussion
In the literature, it is well evident that concentration in a market weakens competition by promoting collusive behaviour between the firms. More specifically, competition in an industry depends on the degree of concentration in the sector. Market is broadly classified into four categories, viz monopoly, oligopoly, monopolistic competition and perfect competition, which are linked with the level of market competition/concentration. In perfect competition, there is no concentration of power and the concentration index would be zero. However, in monopoly, the index would be one. Here, the results are calculated by using nine concentration indices to measure market concentration in the Indian life insurance industry. The indices are calculated for two set of variables, namely 'total premium' and 'first year premium' by both including and excluding 'LIC', to have a clear picture.
Concentration indices based on 'total premium'

Including LIC
The calculated results of concentration indices (including LIC) for 'total premium' of the insurer are presented in Table 6 and Figure 2 (concentration curve). It is clear from Table 6 that the average of HHI, HOV and GRS indices indicates the presence of high market concentration in the life insurance business. However, the average HTI and GIN index values show a low concentration for the same period. The concentration curve in Figure 2 indicates a downward trend up to 2011-12, i.e. the competition level in the industry has been increasing, since the industry was opened up to private players. However, since 2012-13, the index value increased, mainly due to LIC's gain in market share. Further in 2014-15, the concentration has declined due to the rise in market share of private insurers, with increase in unit link premium collections. -0.887 0.926 0.975 0.689 0.857 0.829 0.478 0.340 0.808 Note: ^Based on total premium of the insurers
Average
Excluding LIC
It's clear from Table 7 that there is a significant decline in the level of concentration (all indices for the private sector), during the period 2000-01 to 2011-12. However, the year 2012-13 saw a marginal increase. The HHI, HTI and GIN indices show a very low concentration among the private life insurers, as the index is around 0.10. Overall, it can be concluded that market concentration is very low for life insurance firms in private sector, which can be noticed from Table 7 . Tables 6 and 7 indicate that concentration index of the life insurers (excluding LIC), is lower than the index of the life insurers (including LIC). This indicates that the market concentration of the life insurers is high in presence of LIC than in its absence.
Concentration indices based on 'first year premium'
In life insurance business in India, renewal premium contributes around 60% of the total premium collection in a year and the rest 40% is from the 'first year premium (including single premium 1 )'. In other words, 'first year premium' is the actual business generated by an insurer during a year by selling new products/policies to the customers. This can be termed as 'new business' indicator, which is necessary for an insurer to be profitable and sustain in the market for along term. 
Including LIC
Excluding LIC
The concentration indices calculated by using 'first year premium' as a variable indicates that there is significant reduction in market concentration in Indian life insurance (excluding LIC). The average HHI and GIN index indicate a low concentration in the market by excluding LIC (Table 9 ). This means, market concentration of the life insurers' is high in the presence of LIC than in its absence. There is a fall in the concentration for the same period in terms of CR3, HHI, HTI, GIN and GRS indices of the life insurers for both group of insurers, including and excluding LIC. However, while comparing both the variables (total premium and first year premium) taken for calculating market share, it is seen that total premium as an indicator shows somewhat high concentration than first year single premium.
To sum up, all the concentration index values indicate two different patterns very clearly, that is: 1 there exists a uniform trend across various measures; and 2 although reform process reduced concentration in the insurance industry, the speed of reduction is noticeably slow.
Thus, in the study period all the calculated concentration ratios indicate a decreasing trend, which reflects that concentration in Indian life insurance industry reduced but the regulator may have to facilitate increasing competition further, as the index value ranges from 0.30 to 0.60. 
Testing accuracy of concentration indices
In order to test the accuracy of the concentration indices used to compute the level of market concentration in the life insurance industry in India, the study follows the criterion suggested by Ginevičiusa and Čirba (2009) . The criterion takes the form:
Here, R j is the criterion of accuracy of j-th concentration measure; * ij S is the relative value of the market share as per the formula of j-th concentration measure and S ij is the actual calculated market share.
According to Ginevičiusa and Čirba (2009) , a concentration measure will be most accurate, when R j = 0, reflecting the ideal market situation. The calculated R j values are presented in Table 10 , which indicates that none of the concentration measures is ideally accurate, i.e., R = 0. The difference between the actual market share and the relative market share is more than zero in all the cases. So, to find out a more accurate measure of concentration and not the most accurate measure, it is assumed that smaller the 'R', the more accurate is the measure of market concentration. To have a better insight, the values of 'R' in Table 10 , ranked by assigning 1 to the lowest value and then 2 to the next value in ascending order. The ranking of the measures by accuracy is shown in Table 11 .
Table 10
Comparison of the accuracy of concentration measures As indicated in Table 11 GRS is a more accurate measure of concentration, followed by GIN index and HOV index, in terms of both the indicators (total premium and first year premium). HHI ranked at fourth places in both the variables. Thus, it may be inferred that GRS index is more accurate a measure of concentration in case of the Indian life insurance industry. The calculated GRS index values for the indicators 'total premium' and 'first year premium' both including LIC and excluding LIC are presented in Table 12 . The table shows that the average GRS index value for the period 2000-01 to 2014-15 is high in presence of LIC than in its absence. It is also indicated that the GRS index over the years has declined leaving adequate scope for competition in the industry. 
Concluding remarks
To assess the state of competition and market structure of the Indian life insurance industry, concentration indices are calculated by using a set of nine market concentration indices. Here, it is assumed that a measure of market concentration is a function of the combined market share of all the firms in the industry (Mishra et al., 2011) . So, the concentration indices are calculated on the basis of market share (total premium and first year premium) of the life insurers, both by including and excluding LIC in the industry. The study used the data for the period 2000-01 to 2014-15. Further, by following the criterion suggested by Ginevičiusa and Čirba (2009) , an attempt is made to suggest the best concentration index to study the state of competition in Indian life insurance industry. The concentration indices indicate that: first, there exists a uniform trend across various concentration measures, showing a fall in the concentration across all indices of the life insurers for both the samples including and excluding LIC in terms of total premium and first year premium except in the year 2013-14. Secondly, though reform process seems to have reduced concentration in the life insurance sector, the speed of reduction is noticeably slow. Among all the concentration measures, HHI, HTI and GIN indices portray low market concentration of life insurance companies, compared to other indices. By following the Ginevičiusa and Čirba (2009) criterion, GRS index is found to be the most accurate index to measure concentration in life insurance in India. The GRS index indicates that though the concentration in the market has declined, still it remains at a relatively higher level. So, there is adequate scope for the regulator to promote competition in the life insurance industry in India. Going forward, the industry is showing a recovery in premium collections and is expected to go up in the next few years since the government is initiating a number of reform measures.
